








Farmer, L. (2020) Civil order, markets, and the intelligibility of the criminal 
law. University of Toronto Law Journal, 70(S1), pp. 123-140. (doi: 10.3138/utlj.2019-
0063) 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 














Deposited on 5 August 2020 
 




















Civil Order, Markets,  






I. Introduction: Civil Order and the Criminal Law 
“An effective and properly functioning system of criminal law and criminal justice is 
essential for the relative security of mutual expectations which is a condition of the 
civility of civil society. Criminal law becomes fully intelligible only from this 
perspective.”1  
Criminal law is, in an important sense, as this quote from Neil MacCormick suggests, 
concerned with the question of how we live together with others. There is, though, 
disagreement over the nature of the contribution that criminal law makes to social life: does 
the criminal law simply maintain a pre-established peace or order, or does it make a more 
substantial contribution to the ongoing maintenance of social relations? Thus, for some the 
contribution of criminal law is expressed in the claim that punishment restores civil peace.2 
While it is not entirely clear how punishment, or the threat of punishment, performs (or could 
perform) this function, it appears that it is understood largely at an individual level: either the 
justified punishment of an individual offender by the state prevents others from taking the 
law into their own hands, or the restoration is largely symbolic as the justified punishment of 
the offender restores the order/peace that has been breached by the commission of a crime. 
While preventing vigilantism and redressing wrongdoing are undeniably important, this 
seems to be an overly reductive account of the social functions of criminal law. It focuses 
primarily on punishment as retribution, says little about how something as coercive as 
punishment might contribute to civil peace, and pays little attention other possible functions 
of criminal law such as establishing norms of conduct.3 The alternative view is that criminal 
law contributes to “a collective life under stable public institutions … providing crucial 
support to shared attitudes of reciprocity”.4 This second version is concerned with the 
contribution of criminal law to building and sustaining particular kinds of civil order but, 
even so, the precise nature of its contribution to, or support for, civil order remains unclear. 
My aim in this paper is to contribute to our understanding of this function of criminal law by 
looking at some historical and theoretical dimensions of the relationship between criminal 
law and civil order. 
One of the problems, however, is that the meaning of the term ‘civil order’ – though it 
is of increasing currency – is unclear, and so it is necessary to start by exploring what this 
might mean. A starting point must be the recognition that order is not an abstract quality but 
 
* I am especially grateful to Catherine Evans for her comments on my draft paper and to the participants in the 
workshop for their feedback. 
1 N MacCormick, Institutions of Law (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), p.293 going on to point out that it also 
requires confidence that wrongdoers will be tried and prosecuted fairly. 
2 See e.g. C Roxin, “Prevention, Censure and Responsibility. The Recent Debate on the Purposes of 
Punishment” in AP Simester et al, Liberal Criminal Theory. Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (Abingdon: Hart 
Publishing, 2014) at p.26: “The will of its citizens obliges the state to safeguard our communal life in peace and 
freedom”. 
3 We might also ask what happens when the excessive punishment of certain communities threatens social 
order: see V Chiao, “Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment” (2017) 11 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 431. 
4 V Chiao, “What is Criminal Law For?” (2016) 35 Law and Philosophy 137-63 at p.138. 




depends particularly on the understanding of what (or who) is to be ordered, and the means 
available for ordering. And the quality or nature of that order is given a particular shape or 
content by the qualifier ‘civil’.5 Equally, it is not clear what makes an order ‘civil’, as this 
might range from the creation of formal structures which permit individuals to live together 
in society to more mundane (but no less important) beliefs about civility, in the sense of 
expectations about how we should behave towards others in a range of different contexts.6 I 
shall argue here that we can only really access these questions by understanding the meaning 
of civil order as a historically situated question – that is to say that both the question of what 
amounts to order, and conceptions of civility depend on the exploration of particular 
historical contexts. However, rather than focusing (at least initially) on the meaning of civil 
order, I want instead to look at a different part of the quotation from MacCormick with which 
I began. This is the final sentence, where he makes the, perhaps slightly odd-looking, claim 
that criminal law only becomes “fully intelligible” from the perspective of the securing of 
civil order. I want to start, then, by asking what is meant by intelligibility in this context. I 
shall then go on, first, to explore the particular significance of civil order in modernity: how 
order was conceived of as a specific kind of problem in modernity, and how this has shaped 
the modern understanding of the criminal law. And then, in the final section I shall look at a 
neglected dimension of this understanding of civil order by looking at understandings of the 
relation between the market and the criminal law. 
 
 
II. Civil Order and the Intelligibility of the Criminal Law 
What does it mean to claim that criminal law only becomes “fully intelligible” from the 
perspective of securing civil order? In attempting to answer this, we can begin by 
distinguishing two possible meanings of intelligibility: criminal law’s intelligibility to itself, 
and criminal law’s intelligibility as a social practice.7  
The first of these is concerned with the internal ordering of criminal law. This might 
raise questions such as, by what criteria are rules recognised as being part of the criminal law, 
rather than another body of rules? (Is it criminal law or is it tort law? Is it a rule of criminal 
law or an administrative regulation? Criminal or civil?). What is the internal relation between 
diverse rules of criminal law? (General part and special part, rules and principles, substantive 
law and procedure?). How are the different kinds of rules understood as being linked together 
into some sort of system? There are any number of different ways of answering these kinds of 
questions, and this project of exploring the internal intelligibility of criminal law has arguably 
dominated modern criminal law theory. These are, in a broad sense, questions of 
classification and coherence: what counts as a rule of criminal law, and what is its relation to 
other rules of criminal law. There is nothing a priori or necessary about these classifications 
– what we think of as ‘criminal law’ is rather the product of an immense amount of 
theoretical labour to establish and naturalise these sorts of inner connections, to establish the 
conceptual schema and shared language that allow us as criminal lawyers to treat criminal 
law as (at least in principle) an internally coherent and unified body of law.8 
 
5 For further discussion see L Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law. Criminalization and Civil Order 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2016) ch.2. The same point might be made about the term ‘civil peace’. For a discussion of 
the concept of peace, see LF Edwards, “The Peace: The Meaning and Production of Law in the Post-
Revolutionary United States” (2011) University of California, Irvine LR 565-85. 
6 See N Elias, The Civilising Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) for a discussion of how these different senses 
are related to each other. 
7 See also the discussion in L Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law at pp.140-44. 
8 Cf. M Foucault, The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 1970) 
pp.xix-xx. See also Ristroph, in this issue. 




 The second sense of intelligibility is, I think, that which MacCormick is primarily 
referring to in the passage quoted. This is the matter of the ‘social’ intelligibility of criminal 
law. Here the question of intelligibility relates to the social function of the criminal law: how 
should we understand what criminal does (or purports to do) in our society? Does it make 
sense as a social practice? His answer is that criminal law contributes to the securing of 
mutual expectations, and that this in some way contributes to what he calls the civility of civil 
society. His account is thus focused on the role of criminal law in establishing norms of 
conduct, and in ensuring that our expectations about the stability of those norms can be 
maintained, even in cases where the norms themselves have been breached. There might be 
other kinds of responses to this question of the social function of the criminal law, including 
those which link social peace and just punishment but, as I suggested above, if we are to 
make such claims it is necessary to say more about how the criminal law performs this 
function. It is also important to note that it has also been argued that criminal law does not 
represent such communal or shared interests at all, that it secures the interests of powerful 
social or ethnic groups, that it is a tool of state or gender repression, or that it is an ideological 
system which masks the unequal application of the law through a focus on abstract concepts 
of responsibility, and so on. Far from securing civil order, it is argued that the order it secures 
lacks those basic qualities of civility or engagement in a shared project. Whether we agree or 
disagree with this, the ‘intelligibility’ of the criminal law requires the recognition that 
criminal law is always also a social practice, and that understanding it as a social practice 
requires that we pay attention to the function of the law and the degree of social acceptance 
or legitimacy of the criminal law. (Does it in fact secure trust? Do people trust the criminal 
law?). It is, in short, necessary to ask what kind of civil order is being secured and how the 
criminal law does this. 
 In addition to this, I would argue that understanding the intelligibility of the criminal 
law also depends on the relation between these two senses of intelligibility – between what 
we might call the internal and external order of the criminal law. Lacey has described these as 
issues of co-ordination and legitimacy, with questions of co-ordination referring to the 
internal coherency or functioning of the law, and legitimacy referring to the external authority 
and social acceptance of the system of criminal law.9 And there may be tension here in that a 
system might be internally coherent and co-ordinated but might lack legitimacy or trust – or 
indeed vice versa. This relationship between internal and external order or intelligibility has 
also, in a certain sense, structured recent debates about over-criminalisation: the argument is 
that the extension of the criminal law to certain kinds of conduct, or the development of new 
kinds of offence structures, are inconsistent with the internal order, or core, of the criminal 
law and that this in turn challenges the legitimacy or social function of the law.10 The 
argument against ‘over-criminalisation’ thus takes the form that it is necessary to stabilise the 
relation between the internal and the external by making the external order conform to the 
internal. The ‘proper’ scope of the criminal law is conceived in terms of an ideal relationship 
between internal and external – though it need hardly be pointed out that there might be many 
other ways of conceiving of this relationship. We can thus see that these different dimensions 
of intelligibility bring into focus different dimensions of the relationship between order, civil 
order and criminal law. To speak only of order in the sense of internal coherence is 
insufficient, because it does not engage either with the social function of law or the question 
of how the internal and external order of the criminal law are related. However, as first step 
in seeking to these aspects of the criminal law it is necessary to focus on the meaning of 
civility so as to identify some of the specific means by which criminal law secures order.  
 
9 N Lacey, In Search of Responsibility. Ideas, Interests and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2016) ch.1 
10 See notably D Husak, Overcriminalisation (Oxford, Oxford UP, 2007). 




At its widest, the civil in ‘civil order’ denotes a relatively structured normative order; 
in this sense it refers to an ongoing process of ‘civil’ ordering, concerned with the ways that 
humans live together in communities.11 On Oakeshott’s influential account, this civil 
condition is to be understood primarily in terms of the rules which are the conditions of the 
practice of living together in a community as equals.12 While his account of rules is broadly 
framed to include a range of formal and informal norms, writings about civil order in this 
sense have tended to focus on the constitutive rules and institutions of the state, understood as 
the framework that enables individuals as moral agents to live together in a political 
community with equal amounts of freedom.13 This understanding of civil order is also linked 
to the concept of civil society, understood as the kind of public space created by liberal 
institutions which accommodates the kinds of meaningful public discourse that sustain and 
reproduce those institutions.14 Civil order from this perspective can be distinguished by the 
existence of legal rules and institutions, but it is important to remember that its meaning is 
not exhausted by this, and to focus exclusively on the law may be to risk overlooking other 
significant dimensions of the term ‘civil’.15 
First of all, that something is civil suggests a quality of civility; this is less a matter of 
formal (legal) order than of norms of conduct. Such rules of civil conduct imply some sort of 
relationship between persons – that we recognise each other as common participants in that 
civil community, as ‘citizens’ in a broad sense.16 These norms govern how we present 
ourselves to others in different social settings and interactions – whether this be sharing 
public spaces (such as buses and trains, roads and pavements or cafes and pubs) or interacting 
in more formal settings such as public meetings or workplaces.17 Such practices might be 
underpinned by more formal legal norms – say those prohibiting smoking in enclosed spaces, 
or dangerous driving, or laws against racial or sexual discrimination – but we would not 
normally explain the practices in terms of those norms. This understanding of civility, then, is 
not simply an alternative to the first sense of civil order but is complementary to it. The 
institutions and norms of the political order depend on and also foster the existence of social 
norms governing speech and conduct; and the relationship between formal and informal 
norms might vary according to the different kinds of community. There is thus a relationship 
between civility and the maintenance of a broader kind of civic space or civic identity – even 
if we should note that the relationship between these kinds of standards of civility and 
community is not unproblematic.18  
Going on, an older meaning of civil order understands it as something which is 
opposed to that which is uncivilised or barbarous. Used in this sense civility is a measure by 
 
11 M Oakeshott, “On the Civil Condition” in On Human Conduct (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975) pp.111-2 on the 
idea of ‘civitas’. 
12 Oakeshott, “Civil Condition” pp.121-2, though his sense of equality is probably closer to the idea of common 
participants, discussed below. 
13 See M Thorburn, “Criminal Law as Public Law” in RA Duff & SP Green (eds.), Philosophical Foundations 
of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010); RA Duff, The Realm of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2018) 
ch.4. 
14 See F Trentmann (ed.), Paradoxes of Civil Society (revised edn.)(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003). 
15 For discussion of the historical origins of these different senses of civility, see K Thomas, In Pursuit of 
Civility. Manners and Civilization in Early Modern England (New Haven, Co: Yale UP, 2018). 
16 Oakeshott, “Civil Condition” p.127: “Agents acknowledging themselves to be cives in virtue of being related 
to one another in the recognition of a practice composed of rules”. 
17 P Smith et al, Incivility. The Rude Stranger in Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010). 
18 While they may help to constitute a community, they may also exclude those who are unfamiliar with those 
norms, or who are unwilling or unable to comply with them. See L Farmer, “Civility, Obligation and Criminal 
Law” in D Matthews & S Veitch (eds.), Law, Obligation, Community (London: Routledge, 2018) 219 at pp.227-
31. 




which we might compare one order, or type of order, to others. While this usage is perhaps 
not a widespread as was once the case, it continues to appear in claims about the penal 
practices of civilised nations – often in relation to the practices of some putatively less 
civilised country. And it might also be seen as implicit in the claim that some sort of civil 
order is better than no order at all, or even more specifically than the barbarous state of nature 
envisaged by Hobbes. What is significant here is to recognise that a claim about the civility 
of a civil order is not always, or exclusively, a claim internal to that order, but frequently rests 
on a comparison, the terms of which are not always articulated. If a civil order is understood 
as a ‘civilised’ order, then it is necessary to be clear about what is at stake in such a 
comparison. Also resting on comparison is a further sense of the term civil as meaning ‘not 
criminal’. A civil order, therefore might be one where there is no crime – whether because the 
criminal law is unnecessary or because the criminal law offers a means of responding to 
crime is unclear. However, it might also be an order in which conduct is governed by 
principles or rules of civil or private law, and which is accordingly not seen as falling within 
the proper scope of the criminal law. Rules of criminal law might thus have a role to play in 
defining the boundaries of ‘civil’ conduct but would not necessarily be understood as 
implicated in ongoing civil relations.  
In the next two parts of this paper I shall explore how these different factors shaped 
the conception of civil order that emerged in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth 
centuries, and how the criminal law changed in response to these new demands for securing 
order. In the first part I will look at how civil order was understood and at the role of the 
criminal law in securing that order. In the following part I will then look at how the question 
of market regulation was understood. Broadly speaking, in modernity the market has been 
understood as ‘self-regulating’, or as an area of social life that has not required regulation by 
the criminal law. This raises the questions of intelligibility in a particularly acute way, as it 
becomes necessary to ask why ‘market’ crimes are not normally seen as a core part of the 
modern criminal law (internal intelligibility) and how changes in the social function of the 
criminal law in relation to certain kinds of market crime (social intelligibility) can be seen as 
opening up this question of the relation between internal and external order.  
   
 
III. Civil order in modernity 
As contrasted with smaller more traditional communities, society in modernity is understood 
as a system of common life where individuals of roughly equal status have social 
relationships with comparative strangers.19 Where traditional social forms were primarily 
based on kinship and hierarchy in small, geographically co-located, communities, modern 
society is based on changed social geographies that raise different kinds of questions of order. 
It is, for example, striking to note that over fifty percent of the world’s population are now 
estimated to live in cities, a trend that began when Britain in 1871 became the first 
predominantly urban society, with more than 50% of its population living in cities or large 
towns.20 The population, moreover, is both larger and more mobile. Individuals move 
between cities, and even countries, in forms of mass public transport or by means of private 
 
19 See MB Becker, Civility and Society in Western Europe, 1300-1600 (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988) ch.1. 
The distinction between traditional and modern societies is central to modern social theory e.g. from status to 
contract (Maine), between mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim) or between gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft (Tönnies). These accounts all capture the idea of movement from a fixed ‘traditional’ society to a 
more fluid and individualistic modern society – and are seeking to explain how it is that modern societies are 
ordered. 
20 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html; J Vernon, 
Distant Strangers. How Britain became Modern (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 2014) ch.1  




transport, each of which pose massive challenges of co-ordination both in terms of 
infrastructure – how spaces and modes of transport are organized and maintained – and of co-
ordination, as individuals have continually to adjust their conduct to the conduct of others. 
The problem of order in modern societies is thus one of living in close proximity to strangers, 
which gives rise to new challenges for the conduct of social, political and economic life. In 
place of the household, which was the model of order in pre-modern societies, modern 
society is fragmented, organized around the city, the market, the workplace, the home and so 
on, each of which are themselves ordered in their own distinctive way and which entail 
different kinds of contact or engagement with others, and in which different spheres of life 
have their own codes of trust and civility. This means that in different social contexts it can 
become necessary to project oneself and to establish social relations in a range of different 
ways: to show authority, to establish new kinds of shared rights and interests (sociability), to 
bargain and exchange, and so on. In each of these spheres of life there are different kinds of 
expectations about conduct and credibility. Codes of civility – understood in terms of 
changing norms of individual conduct, such as controlling one’s body, adjusting one’s 
conduct to accommodate others, establishing trust, and avoiding giving offense to others – 
can thus become complex and differentiated, and the individual in modern society must learn 
how to negotiate different kinds of context. Such codes and norms of conduct are not natural 
or inherent, and do not arise by chance, but are actively constructed, and institutions such as 
the state can play a crucial role in their establishment.  
Central to our understanding of modern society is that it is made up of individuals who 
are rational, social, agents who live together and collaborate for mutual benefit.21 However, 
our understanding of the ‘civil condition’ should not be built up from the idea of a notional 
small community but should be understood in terms of the distinctive challenges of modern 
society.22 Civil order in this sense is not primarily a matter of the organization of moral 
community but is concerned with the ongoing co-ordination of complex societies composed 
of a range of entities or legal persons that are responsible, in different ways, for their own 
conduct, for the wellbeing of others and for the maintenance of social institutions. The 
problem of order is thus that of governing individual conduct across the range of institutions 
and contexts which make up modern society. This, I would argue, is distinctively civil 
because people must be addressed as responsible, autonomous self-governing subjects who 
both pursue their own interests and recognize the obligations that we owe to each other. The 
quality of ‘civility’ is linked to the framework of law, which not only provides a framework 
which secures individual freedoms, but also subjects the process of government to specific 
requirements and constraints, precisely because modern law addresses citizens as responsible, 
autonomous, self-governing subjects. Civil order is thus a particular kind of institutional 
order in which the burden of guaranteeing social and normative order is taken on by 
centralized institutions. This then is important for thinking about social relations (‘the civility 
of civil society’) in a modern industrial and urban society, and it has implications for how 
society was governed or administered, and thus for the criminal law.  
We can note a number of specific implications of this for the development of the 
modern criminal law.23 First, in modernity the criminal justice system moved away from 
institutions based on localized or community knowledge towards more bureaucratic 
institutions, operating according to more abstract standards. As is well known, for example, 
 
21 C Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2004) chs.1 & 2. 
22 JS Coleman, “Prologue: Constructed Social Organization” in P Bourdieu & JS Coleman, Social Theory for a 
Changing Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991). Cf. Oakeshott, “Civil Condition” which takes a 
local, traditionally structured, community as its foundation for understanding civility. 
23 See generally Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law. 




the criminal trial shifted from the ‘altercation’ trial, reliant on local knowledge of the 
character of an accused, to a more formal adversarial trial, controlled by lawyers.24 Informal 
systems of watchmen and peacekeepers, were replaced by a professional police force, which 
was subject to increasingly standardized rules about the appearance and conduct of officers. 
Criminal laws, together with rules of evidence and procedure, were themselves increasingly 
‘codified’ or formulated as abstract general rules. These formulated clear standards of 
conduct which were capable of general application, while at the same time subjecting the 
criminal justice system itself to a new kind of ordering.25 Second, clearer standards of 
responsibility were formulated in criminal law, in the sense both of identifying conditions for 
the attribution of liability, and in the prospective sense of imposing obligations and duties on 
a persons who were deemed to be capable of adapting their conduct to norms and to plan over 
time.26 Third, this was accompanied by large changes to the substance of the criminal law as 
it aimed at altering standards of behavior. In the area of offences against the person, for 
example, the criminal law was part of a civilizing initiative, criminalizing a greater range of 
forms of interpersonal violence and codifying new standards of self-control.27 The focus 
broadly of the criminal law was less on dealing with one-off breaches of the king’s peace 
than with regulating irresponsible or anti-social conduct. Finally, we should note that there 
were significant changes to the internal ordering of law. This is a shift that is reflected not 
only in the focus on individual conduct, rather than offences against the state or religion, but 
also in the fact that social wrongs were reconceived in terms of the harms or wrongs that are 
done to the interests of individuals.28 Criminal law was thus reconceived as a framework for 
protecting a certain kind of social individuality.  
Overall, we can see how the criminal law was transformed to secure social interests by 
establishing measures civilizing conduct, by building and reinforcing trust between 
individuals – and responding to situations where the appropriate standards of conduct had not 
been met. The modern criminal law is intelligible as a social practice which aims at 
regulating the social conduct of individuals through law. 
 
 
IV. Civil Markets? 
In the last section I argued that the emergence of the ‘society of strangers’, in the late 
eighteenth century was accompanied by a huge drive to transform, and indeed ‘civilize’, civil 
society, and that the criminal law played a central role in this process by defining new 
standards of conduct and responsibilities for legal subjects. Economic historians have noted 
that a parallel process of dealing with strangers was occurring with markets and market 
transactions.29 However, in contrast to the developing role of criminal law in relation to 
government of civil society, a number of well-established criminal laws relating to the 
governance of markets were being abolished. 
 
24 See J Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003); DJA Cairns, 
Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800-1865 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998). 
25 Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law, ch.5 
26 N Lacey, In Search of Responsibility; Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law, ch.6. 
27 J Carter Wood, Violence and Crime in Nineteenth-Century England. The Shadow of our Refinement (London: 
Routledge, 2004); KD Watson, Assaulting the Past. Violence and Civilization in Historical Context (Newcastle: 
CSP, 2008); Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law, ch.8. 
28 See e.g. A Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1966) p.156: 
“From whatever motive wrongs are committed, there are different particulars in which the injured may suffer. 
He may suffer in his goods, in his person, or in the freedom of his conduct.” 
29 See principally J Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy. An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1850 (Yale UP, 
2009). See also Vernon, Distant Strangers, ch.4. 




This can be illustrated by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s History of the Criminal Law 
of England (1883). This contains an important chapter on ‘Offences relating to Trade and 
Labour’ which both documents changes in this area and offers some explanation as to why 
these had come about.30 Stephen introduced the chapter by noting that this was an area in 
which the law had changed greatly. He argued that, on the one hand, when England had been 
mainly agricultural, and commerce undeveloped, many of the present day laws had not 
existed because they were not needed; and on the other hand, “proceedings which we now 
regard as part of the common course of business were treated as crimes.”31 He accordingly 
divided the offences under discussion into three broad classes. The first class was made up of 
offences consisting in a “supposed preference of private to public interest” – usury, 
forestalling and regrating and labour combinations – which he argued had mainly been 
abolished and were of historical interest only.32 The second was made up of offences against 
laws regulating particular trades and labour practices, which he suggested were mainly 
obsolete.33 And the third class was commercial frauds, which were largely newer offences to 
deal with the new challenges posed by the spread of commerce.  
The controversy around crimes of forestalling, regrating and engrossing – the 
hoarding or buying up goods (primarily foodstuffs) during a time of shortage in order to 
exploit the situation and sell for a higher price – illustrates how practices and understandings 
were changing in this area in the late eighteenth century. The crimes aimed at preventing 
speculation on price – so merchants could not buy up grain and store it until the price rose 
and sell it at a higher price, buy and resell at a higher price in the same market, or move grain 
out of particular localities to areas where they might sell it for a higher price.34 The crime was 
thus linked to the medieval practice according to which, during times of food shortages, 
magistrates could seize grain being stored by merchants and sell it for what they determined 
to be a fair or just market price – the so-called ‘police’ of grain.35 This ‘moral economy’ had 
survived on the grounds that it was necessary to ensure that the price of grain was fair and to 
protect the subsistence of all parts of the community (particularly in times of dearth), but also 
thereby preventing riots due the shortage of food in particular localities.36 The legality of this 
practice had begun to be challenged over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries partly as a matter of practicality: as larger towns had started to grow, it was 
necessary to ensure that grain and other foodstuffs were moved from rural areas – and this 
required the corn merchants to be active in buying up supplies before they could reach local 
markets even in breach of the these laws. Parliament abolished the statutory offences in a 
statute of 1772, but in spite of this the common law continued to be enforced in some 
localities at times of particular shortage.37  
 
30 3 vols (London: Macmillan, 1883) III, ch.XXX. 
31 Ibid, p.192. 
32 Ibid. p.193. 
33 Though he noted a tendency for the legislature to introduce new offences aimed at particular branches of trade 
and manufacture notwithstanding that these might conflict with the views of political economists. See History, 
III, pp.192-3 and 228.  
34 E Coke, Third Institute, 194-5; W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-9) (Chicago: 
Chicago UP, 1979) IV, 158-9. See also 5 & 6 Edw.VI c.14, though it is likely that this was merely restating the 
common law. 
35 J Davis, Medieval Market Morality. Life, Law and Ethics in the English Marketplace 1200-1500 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2012) pp.55-65, 117-20 & 440-7. 
36 EP Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd” and “Moral Economy Revisited” in Customs in 
Common (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993). 
37 12 Geo.III c.71. 




This came to a head in the case of Waddington (1800) arising from the dearth and 
high food prices between in the late 1790s.38 Waddington was a hop merchant from Kent who 
was convicted of a number of offences relating to ‘engrossing’ (or withholding from market) 
a quantity of hops in both Kent and Worcester. He brought an appeal to the court of King’s 
Bench. For his part, Waddington sought to argue (amongst other things) that the facts did not 
disclose a crime known to the law and that, even if this had formerly been the case, the crime 
had been abolished by the Act of 1772 which regarded the laws as “detrimental to the supply 
of the labouring and manufacturing poor of the kingdom.”39 The court, led by Lord Kenyon 
who was strongly resistant to the idea of dismantling traditional protections, disagreed, 
arguing that the various statutes had merely altered the penalties for these offences, leaving 
the common law untouched. After commenting that he had read Adam Smith, amongst 
others, on this topic he went on to argue that if his conduct was carried on: 
“with a view to enhance the price of the commodity; to deprive people of their 
ordinary subsistence, or else to compel them to purchase it at an exorbitant price; who 
can deny that this is an offence of the greatest magnitude?... It is our duty to take care 
that persons in pursuing their own particular interests do not transgress those laws 
which were made for the benefit of the whole community.”40 
Waddington’s conviction was accordingly upheld, and he was fined £500 and sentenced to 
imprisonment for one month.41 Paradoxically, as Hay has shown, these and other convictions 
were met with riots and attacks on the property of merchants and middlemen, giving rise to 
concerns on the part of the authorities that too-rigid an enforcement of the traditional laws 
might be counter-productive.42 On Kenyon’s death in 1802, he was succeeded as Lord Chief 
Justice by Edward Law, Lord Ellenborough, who had enthusiastically led Waddington’s 
defence. The courts quietly gave up on the idea of penalties for forestalling and the offence 
itself was finally abolished in 1844.43 
Underlying these legal conflicts was an ongoing political debate about controls on 
trade in foodstuffs, that has come to be seen as central to the emergence of the new ‘science’ 
of political economy.44 Traditionalists, such as Kenyon, defended the idea of the moral 
economy: that the legislature had a responsibility towards all parts of the community, and that 
this required them to take measures to regulate prices and food supply by stopping what they 
saw as profiteering. They recognized, moreover, that in times of shortage posed a risk to 
social order that could not be ignored. On the other side, the campaign to repeal the statutes 
on forestalling, led by Edmund Burke, had argued that the offences actually increased prices 
 
38 There were in fact two separate cases reported in (1800) 1 East 143; 102 ER 56 and (1800) 1 East 168; 102 
ER 65. See also Rusby (1800) Peake Add Cas.; 170 ER 241. The cases and their background are discussed in 
detail in D Hay, “The State and the Market in 1800: Lord Kenyon and Mr Waddington” (1999) 162 Past and 
Present 101-62. For a discussion of comparable Scottish case law, see C Whatley, “Custom, Commerce and 
Lord Meadowbank: The Management of the Meal Market in Urban Scotland, c.1740–c.1820” (2012) Journal of 
Scottish Historical Studies 1-27. 
39 102 ER 56 at 59. 
40 Ibid at 62. He had earlier in his judgment suggested that this was “a most heinous offence against religion and 
morality, and against the established law of the country” (at p.61). 
41 He was fined a further £500 and sentenced to another three months imprisonment in the second case. It is 
noteworthy that Grose J in sentencing compared forestalling to theft, which was a capital felony (at p.64). 
42 Hay, “The State and the Market” pp.145-6. 
43 7 & 8 Vict. c.24. Hay, “The State and the Market” pp.153-6) suggests that the laws were in practice a dead 
letter after 1802. 
44 See I Hont & M Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: An Introductory Essay” in Hont & 
Ignatieff, Wealth and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983) ch.1; E Rothschild, Economic Sentiments. 
Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard UP, 2001) ch.3; M Hill & W 
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and interfered with the food supply.45 The emblematic figure, though, was Adam Smith who 
addressed the topic in The Wealth of Nations (1776) in a widely read section entitled 
‘Digression on the Corn Laws”.46 Smith defended the “unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the 
corn trade”, arguing that magistrates should not interfere with the workings of the markets to 
determine price by artificial means.47 He claimed that dearths were caused by natural 
shortages, rather than the actions of merchants, and that famines were caused by “the 
violence of the government attempting, by improper means, to remedy the inconveniences of 
a dearth.”48 He thus concluded that: 
“[T]he law ought always to trust people with the care of their own interests, as in their 
local situations they must generally be able to judge better of it than the legislator can 
do.”49 
The market, in other words, was the most efficient means for the distribution of goods, and 
political economy should trump moral economy. 
 Stephen argued that a similar pattern – albeit taking place over a longer period of time 
– of the dismantling of traditional protections in favour of the operation of the free market, 
could be seen in crimes relating to labour. The issue in this area concerned the questions of 
the legality of trade unions and free bargaining and whether these amounted to conspiracies 
in restraint of trade. He saw three stages in the development of these laws. The Combination 
Acts, prohibiting combinations of workers to improve the conditions of their labour, were 
seen as linked to old laws protecting markets – specifically the idea that levels of wages and 
hours of work were customary, and that conduct which interfered with these customary levels 
should be prohibited.50 In 1824 the Combination Acts were repealed, and replaced in 1825 
with new legislation which, while broadly permitting meetings to discuss wages and 
conditions of work, created a series of new offences around the use of threats, obstruction and 
intimidation.51 While this formally recognized an idea of free contract and freedom of 
association, as workers could negotiate over their terms of work, in practice this was severely 
limited as a majority could not impose their views on other workers. On top of this, trade 
unions (combinations) were increasingly prosecuted as common law conspiracies in restraint 
of trade as, in a series of decisions in the 1840s and 1850s, the courts expanded the scope of 
the doctrine of conspiracy.52 While this was done in the name of free contract – the courts 
claimed to be acting to protect the freedom of individual workers and employers – Stephen 
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argues that the effect was that the law was protecting employers.53 Stephen accordingly 
argues that it was not until 1871, when it was established that combinations should not be 
treated as an indictable conspiracy (unless the act would be criminal if done by a single 
person), that the principles of the free market were established in relation to labour.54 
 While Stephen’s reading of this history has been contested, its significance here lies in 
the fact that he played down wider political debates and framed the development of the law in 
terms of an unfolding logic of political economy.55 From this perspective the Combination 
Acts, along with other measures such as the Statute of Apprentices and the Statute of 
Artificers, were seen as an interference with freedom of contract and an impediment to the 
free operation of the market in labour.56 This argument, once again, drew on Adam Smith 
who had noted that the interests of workmen and masters were not the same, as the former 
would combine to increase wages, the latter to decrease them. However, he had also pointed 
out that the masters had the advantage because they were fewer in number and had greater 
resources – and because the law did not prohibit their combinations.57 By the 1820s, though, 
it was workers’ combinations that were seen as the larger problem, as political economy took 
a more conservative turn, and they were condemned for interfering with the laws of supply 
and demand, and the use of secrecy and illicit means to obtain their ends.58 However, the law 
was inexorably moving towards the position that labour was a form of property and that 
“each individual man and every body of men, however constituted, is the best judge of his or 
their own interests, and ought to be allowed to pursue those interests by any method short of 
violence or fraud”.59 
What is significant about these areas more broadly is that they concern the markets for 
food and labour, areas that had been at the heart of controversies over the development of 
political economy.60 The control and regulation of these markets, moreover, went beyond 
narrow questions of supply and demand and was a matter of competing conceptions of social 
order. EP Thompson, for example, in his famous account of food riots, describes the systems 
as moral economy versus political economy.61 The former was a paternalist model in which 
the aristocracy and landed gentry bore responsibility for providing the necessaries of life (a 
fair wage and fairly priced food), backed by a protective institutional expression in law, and 
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emergency routines in times of dearth.62 The older offences thus presupposed a certain 
understanding of the market. The market was less a regulatory idea than a particular place 
where bargains could be struck between producers and consumers who were bound together 
by their place in the local community. The ‘fair’ price was not an outcome of bargaining but 
something that was determined outwith the market, taking into account social relations and 
obligations within the community.63 However, this ‘market’ had been changing over a long 
period of time. The growth of cities required intermediaries – grain merchants – to buy up 
local supplies and transport them to urban centres – in order to ensure food supplies. Labour 
practices were changing as people moved to work in new industrial areas and workshops. 
This meant, as Mokyr has commented, that the market was no longer within a small 
community: “People not only bought their daily bread, clothing and houses, but also sold 
their labor and invested their savings through markets, in all aspects of economic life dealing 
with strangers.”64 This clearly then had consequences for how markets were understood. In 
Edmund Burke’s words: 
“Market is the meeting and conference of the consumer and producer, when they 
mutually discover each other’s wants. Nobody, I believe, has observed with any 
reflection what market is, without being astonished at the truth, the correctness, the 
celerity, the general equity, with which the balance of wants is settled.”65 
Here we see that ‘market’ is presented as an abstract idea, a mechanism for balancing wants, 
rather than a particular place or trade. It is not regulated, but is self-regulating as, in the 
classical conception of Adam Smith, allowing the public interest to be served by the pursuit 
of individual interests.66 
 The transition to this new kind of market raised questions of civil order notably, as we 
have seen in relation to food and labour, but also more generally. Commerce required 
predictability, but how was this to be secured when dealing with strangers. These issues were 
in part addressed through the development of new civil institutions, what Mokyr has 
described as a ‘civil economy’ that made it possible to “trade with strangers, deal with people 
with whom there might not be repeated transaction at arm’s length, without trying to take 
advantage of the situation.”67 He describes the development of new norms of gentlemanly 
conduct as ways of sending signals about trustworthiness and reliability, as well as the 
emergence of clubs, friendly societies and associations which sustained networks of co-
operation and trust – at least within certain social classes. Laws were also transformed, 
moving from the regulation of particular trades or markets to the regulation of the market 
more generally. As Vernon has argued, the focus of law moved to securing general standards 
– in money, in weights and measures and so on, that would enable sustain the reliability of 
commerce.68 However, this was also seen as a problem that could be solved by the market 
itself, which was understood as promoting freedom and moral progress. Free labour was seen 
as morally superior to slavery or indentured labour free labour. In the long term a market or 
commercial society would be a more civil society.69 
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This did not remove the need for the criminal law, but it reshaped its role – something 
acknowledged by Stephen, who explained the changes that he described in terms of the 
development of commercial society. While the criminalization of forestalling and 
combinations had generally been justified on the grounds that private interests should be 
limited where the public interest demanded it, the recognition of principles of political 
economy had led to the awareness that such restrictions were wrong because they made 
commerce and the investment of capital impossible.70 The earlier protective legislation, he 
argued had come to be regarded as “opposed to the principles of political economy” and 
abolished.71 The consequence of this was that he saw only a limited role for the criminal law 
in relation to the market: it should not limit private interests except where there was “actual 
force, or the threat of such force and the grosser kinds of fraud”.72 This then led to his 
discussion of the final class of offences against trade, which were commercial frauds and 
fraudulent bankruptcy. These could be seen as crimes of commerce, practices which arose as 
a consequence of the development of commercial society, rather than as practices which 
hindered its emergence. Interestingly, the discussion here is not explicitly framed in terms of 
political economy; the crimes are explained in terms of individual greed and “reckless trading 
and extravagance”, which he argued were equivalent to the “worst kind of theft” and should 
be punished severely.73 Their criminality thus rested on the fact that they could be seen as 
individual wrongdoing, equivalent to other forms of property crime as attacks on private 
interests in civil society. 
Stephen’s account thus demonstrates the impact of political economy on thinking 
about the criminal law. There was a clear separation between market and civil society, as 
different spheres of social life. Markets were assumed to be self-regulating, if not actually 
civilizing, and the role of criminal law was thus limited to the protection of individual 
interests in civil society. What we see here is the emergence of a particular scheme of 
intelligibility which is characteristic of the modern criminal law. According to this 
understanding the market is self-regulating, and so what might be termed ‘market crimes’ are 
no longer integral to the modern criminal law. 
 
 
V. Conclusion  
The decriminalisation of market and labour offences have traditionally been studied from the 
perspective of the rise of freedom of contract: an ideology of freedom to contract leading to 
the dismantling of traditional protections.74 What I have attempted to show here is that the 
consequences of decriminalisation should not only be understood in terms of their impact on 
contract law and the market, but also in terms of their consequences for the criminal law 
itself. Crucially in this case the decriminalisation of conduct did not merely mean a reduction 
in scope of the criminal law, but should be understood as part of a more systematic 
restructuring – what we might call the emergence of a new scheme of intelligibility. In 
concluding I want to reflect briefly on the question of how it affected the internal and external 
‘intelligibility’ of the criminal law.  
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 Internally, the distinction between market and civil society underpins thinking about 
the proper scope of the criminal law, while externally the social function of criminal law is 
seen as that securing the civility of civil society only. Criminal law should protect private 
interests against certain kinds of threats as ‘public’ wrongs; but wrongs in the market are 
understood as private. Markets, then, are seen as ‘civil’ in the non-criminal sense, as the 
sphere of private law and private relations.75 This, however, as we have seen, was not simply 
a matter of laissez-faire in the law more generally, as the criminal law took on an increasing 
burden in terms of establishing proper standards of conduct on civil society, indeed arguably 
underpinning the development of the kind of individualism that was central to the emergence 
of market society. This process has not been simple since there are always boundaries to be 
negotiated between understandings of legitimate and illegitimate transactions and 
ambivalence about the social effects of competition.76 Indeed, the claim that criminal law is 
not concerned with market conduct may be more of a myth, as it was doubtful (as Stephen 
himself recognised) that criminal law ever adhered completely to the precepts of political 
economy. Nevertheless, what is important here is that this conception of different social 
spheres continues to shape our understanding of the proper scope of the criminal law. The 
modern understanding of the social role of criminal law confines its sphere of operation to 
civil society and rules of criminal law which relate to markets (of which there are many) are 
not considered to be part of the ‘proper’ criminal law.77 However, if we are properly to 
understand the role of criminal law in securing civil order it is necessary to reflect not only on 
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